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 The Global and the Local:
 Problematic Dynamics of the Triangular
 Trade in Early Modern Manila*
 BIRGIT M. TREMML
 University of Vienna
 Thanks to a growing awareness of the multilayered1 nature of the South China Sea as a key region in the emerging world trade, the
 question of how European overseas performance and local Asian reac
 tion were related to global economic change has gained new momen
 tum in comparative historical studies in recent years. The crucial
 question of how the encounters between powerful premodern states
 affected economic developments in the so-called European-controlled
 port cities has received limited attention.2 Late sixteenth-century
 Manila, where three premodern states—Spain, China, and Japan—
 were simultaneously involved in urban as well as commercial expan
 sion, serves particularly well for such a study. Focusing on triangular
 * I would like to thank Ashley Hurst and the anonymous referee of this journal for their
 comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to the Newberry Library for
 its generous support during the completion of the article.
 1 In this essay "multilayered" refers to ethnic, social, and political diversity and to cul
 tural and class differences within one premodern state. State-subject relations were rather
 complex and not always easy to define. For example, although people from China and Japan
 often reached the Philippines on a private or illicit mission, they were at least indirectly
 linked to a state. For the multilayered interactions under examination, notions of "foreign"
 or "other" play a key role. The term is furthermore used for the pragmatic reason of avoiding
 occupied terms such as "intercultural" or "multicultural."
 2 The author is aware of the potential for debate to what extent Manila or other mer
 chant outposts in Asia were actually "controlled" by European powers given the fact that for
 all these outposts inter-Asian trade was indispensable, and European sovereignty to a large
 degree depended on compromises with neighboring powers.
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 relations in early modern multicultural Manila, this article aims to
 demonstrate that disentangling Spanish, Chinese, and Japanese opera
 tions is the most efficient way of shedding light on the economic and
 political complexity of the Manila galleon trade that attracted mer
 chants eager to participate in the first truly global commerce in Ameri
 can silver and Chinese silk. The alleged profitability of the Manila
 trade has been the impetus for previous scholarly research. When we
 consider that around 1600, at least 100,000 kilograms of silver circu
 lated in Manila annually, profit ratios up to 300 or 400 percent3 must
 have had an effect on the economy and most likely also on the foreign
 affairs of the countries that traded there regularly.4
 Many scholars nowadays have a gloomy view of the economic per
 formance of Spanish Manila, which is surprising when we look at the
 trade boom that occurred soon after the Spanish occupation. When it
 comes to her qualities as trading hub, both seventeenth-century Euro
 pean observers and early twentieth-century American government
 advisors agreed that Manila had potential for ranking "among the
 most commercially successful places on the globe."5 However, Span
 ish Manila's actual global significance was short-lived and her subse
 quent downturn has raised many unanswered questions. Its undisput
 edly rapid success did not result in sustained economic development,
 neither of the archipelago nor of the city itself. Manila's evolution
 into a thriving port city of global significance contrasts sharply with
 her sickly economy in the following centuries. Manila's commercial
 development raises several questions once we consider that three
 politically and economically powerful premodern principalities, Spain,
 China, and Japan, had regular access to the Manila market.6 My thesis
 is that all these states did not take advantage of the location's obvi
 3 According to Alessandro Valignano, the merchants in Manila gained between 400
 and 500 percent in the late 1590s. Quoted in Antonio Cabezas, El Sigh Ibérico de Japón. La
 Presencia Hispano-Portuguesa en Japón (1543-1643) (Valladolid: Universidad de Valladolid,
 1995), p. 181. See also Chuan Han-Sheng, "Arbitrage, China, and World Trade in the
 Early Modern Period: Spain and the Manila-Acapulco Galleons," in The European's Entr^i
 into the Pacific. Spain and the Manila-Acapulco Galleons, ed. Arturo Giráldez and Dennis O.
 Flynn (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001), pp. 241-260. Chuan estimates profits of 100 to 300
 percent on Chinese silks sold in Mexico.
 4 For a detailed description see the still undisputed classic first published in 1939 by
 William L. Schurz, The Manila Galleon (Manila: Historical Conservation Society, 1985).
 5 Antonio M. Regidor, D. C. L. Jurado, and J. Warren T. Mason, Commercial Progress in
 the Philippine Islands (Manila: American Chamber of Commerce of the Philippine Islands,
 1925), p. 2. For premodern accounts on the global economic significance see Juan Grau y
 Monfalcón, Justificación de la conservación y comercio de las Islas Filipinas (Mexico, 1640).
 6 I will here use Charles Tdly's straight definition of a state: "When the accumula
 tion and concentration of coercive means grow together, they produce states; they pro
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 ous qualities because of differing ideas of sovereignty. In addition, the
 multilayered encounters in Manila had negative effects on the city's
 long-run commercial development. In this article I aim to show that
 Habsburg Spain was unable to take necessary measures because of her
 permanent lack of settlers,7 whereas Ming China, due to its different
 idea of sovereignty, did not tap the full potential of the tens of thou
 sands of coastal Chinese subjects that visited the Philippine islands
 annually. Azuchi-Momoyama/early Tokugawa Japan, as the third and
 often neglected player in early modern Manila, generally showed more
 interest in controlling Manila than her "big brother" China, but Edo's
 political centralization program made long-term efforts unnecessary. By
 the time of intensified Japanese participation in the Manila trade, the
 newly established military-aristocratic government was busy building
 its own stable premodern state. At the end of the day, sovereignty at
 home proved to be more important than overseas expansion.
 Against this background we will soon find out that Manila and
 the Philippines played entirely different roles in these three countries'
 external trade as well as foreign policies, an insight that even in East
 Asia has only recently caught researchers' attention.8 In this light, the
 fact that most studies of premodern Manila failed to take into account
 the influences from China, Japan, and Europe during the 1570s to the
 1640s calls for a reevaluation of the mechanism of the Manila market.
 The Lure of Global Trade in Manila
 At the end of the sixteenth century, Manila developed into a global
 trading outpost of major economic and only slightly less geopolitical
 duce distinct organizations that control the chief concentrated means of coercion within
 well-defined territories, and exercise priority in some respects over all other organizations
 operating within those territories." Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD
 990-1990 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 19.
 7 At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the number of Spanish settlers in the
 whole colony, including soldiers, amounted to some 2,200, at best. The number of house
 holds registered in Manila numbered 300. Luis Merino, The Cabildo Secular or Municipal
 Government in Manila (Iloilo: Research Center of the University de San Agustin, 1980),
 pp. 35-36. In the same period already more than 20,000 Chinese lived in the area around
 Manila, despite an official order from Spain that their number must not exceed 6,000. The
 number of Japanese was fluctuating, ranging between several hundreds and 3,000 between
 the late sixteenth century and the 1640s. Iwao Seiichi, Nanyö Nihonmachi No Seisui (Taipei:
 Taipei Teikoku Daigaku, 1937), pp. 292-300.
 8 See, among others, Igawa Kenji, Daikökai jidai no higashi ajia: Nichiö tsükö no rekishiteki
 zentei (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Köbunkan, 2007). Oishi Shinzagurö, ed., Shuinsen to minami he no
 senkusha (Tokyo: Gyösei, 1986).
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 importance for all trading nations involved. Consequently, her urban
 and economic development became embedded in the complex history
 of Asia's integration into the global economy9 and the Castilian over
 seas empire's involvement in European and American affairs.10 The
 archipelago's relative closeness to China, Japan, and Southeast Asian
 trading hubs encouraged these countries' private merchants to call at
 the favorable natural harbor of Cavite, close to the colonial capital.
 There they connected to centuries-old trading networks of the wider
 maritime region spanning far into the Indian Ocean. Coastal Chinese,
 mostly from southern Fujian, represented the largest group.11 The rel
 atively liberal political environment gave rise to allied Japanese and
 Chinese privateers, the so-called wakö,12 whose economic activities
 could—if required—also include coastal raiding. They reached their
 peak around the middle of the sixteenth century,13 at the same time
 as the Iberians—mostly the Portuguese from the Estado da India, who
 were prominent on the scene throughout the sixteenth century as pio
 neers in building a trading post empire in Asia—appeared as promising
 business partners for the East Asians.14
 While both economists and historians have tried to trace what
 caused the Philippines' eventual economic weakness,15 how that pro
 cess was linked to Manila's short-term success in the late sixteenth
 9 One of the most recent examples of a maritime macro-region approach is Frangois
 Gipouloux, La Méditerranée asiatique: Villes portuaires et réseaux marchands en Chine aujapon
 et en A sie du Sud-Est, XVle-XXle siecle (Paris: CNRS Editions, 2009).
 10 The seemingly endless list includes, for example, hegemonic conflicts with the Por
 tuguese, war with the Dutch, and maritime conflicts with the British.
 11 Overseas merchants from Fujian have sometimes been referred to as Hokkien mer
 chants in previous studies. K. J. Chin, "Merchants and Other Sojourners: The Hokkiens
 Overseas, 1570-1760" (PhD diss., Hong Kong, 1998). Under the label of SM huáqiáo
 (Ch.)/kakyö (J.), their history has been researched in East Asia.
 12 wokou (Ch.) or wakö (J.) literally means "Japanese bandit." But most of the
 time, these groups included a larger number of Chinese than Japanese people.
 13 Maehira Fuseaki, "Mincho no kaikin seisaku to Ryükyü kaikin: Waköron wo chüshin
 ni," Kötsüshi kenkyü 67 (2008): 61-76.
 14 For the Lusitanian network of merchant outposts and its early success based on mili
 tary superiority over Asian business partners see Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in
 World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), in particular chapter 7.
 15 Leslie E. Bauzon, Deficit Government: Mexico and the Philippine Situado, 1606-1804
 (Tokyo: Centre for East Asian Studies, 1981); John L. Phelan, The Hispanization of the Phil
 ippines: Spanish Aims and Filipino Responses, 1565-1700 (Madison: University of Wiscon
 sin Press, 1959). For a reassessment of Bauzon's accounts see Luis Alonso, "Financing the
 Empire: The Nature of the Tax System in the Philippines, 1565-1804," Philippine Studies
 61, no. I (2003): 63-95. F°r a narrative that examines the Manila trade simply as trade
 between Mexico and the Philippines see Oskar H. K. Spate, The Spanish Lake: The Pacific
 since Magellan (Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press, 1979), pp. 218-228.
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 century remains still partly unanswered.16 Scholars like Leslie E. Bau
 zon claim that the prosperous years of the export-oriented commerce—
 mainly based on the Manila galleon trade—consequently hindered the
 further economic development of rural regions and other business sec
 tors due to the easy availability of money pouring in from the Ameri
 cas. Others seem convinced that the poor economic development was
 more the result of unreasonable Spanish governance and less the prod
 uct of the multilayered nature of the area.17 Both viewpoints acknowl
 edge Manila's outstanding economic performance around 1600. As
 an interface between imperial Spain, Ming China, and Japan, Manila
 grew into a global port city by linking various world markets by the end
 of the sixteenth century. Why did the short-term success not mark the
 beginning of a period of prosperous development?
 Long-Term versus Short-Term Effects
 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, probably the most assertive
 advocates of early modern Manila's "miracle," consider the foundation
 of the Spanish colonial city in 1571 as the point when global trade was
 born. In their much-quoted article about the impact of intercontinen
 tal silver flows on world affairs, they claimed that "Manila was the cru
 cial entrepot linking substantial, direct, and continuous trade between
 the Americas and Asia for the first time in history."18 As such, late
 sixteenth-century Manila, as the Asian outpost of the Manila galleon
 trade, became a center for intercontinental exchange of American—
 and to a certain extent also Japanese—silver and Chinese silks and
 ceramics.19 Yet, as has been the case in several other works dealing with
 the Philippines, while highlighting Manila's remarkable growth at the
 time, they provide a very bleak view of Spanish performance in Asia.
 16 For an insightful picture of the transpacific bullion cargoes, Chaunu's study is still
 unchallenged. Pierre Chaunu, Les Philippines et le Pacifique des lbériques (XVJe, XVIIe,
 XVIIIe siécles) (Paris: SEVPEN, i960).
 17 John Villiers, "Portuguese Malacca and Spanish Manila: Two Concepts of Empire,"
 in Aspects in History and Economic History (Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries), ed. Roderich
 Ptak, pp. 37-57 (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1987). Charles R. Boxer, "Plata Es Sangre: Sidelights
 on the Drain of Spanish-American Silver in the Far East 1500-1700," Philippine Studies 18,
 no. 3 (1970): 457-478.
 18 Dennis O. Flynn and Arturo Giráldez, "Born with a Silver Spoon: The Origins of
 World Trade in 15 71," Journal of World History 6 (1995): 201.
 19 For Japanese silver contributions to Ming China see Nakajima Gakushö,
 "Jyürokusekimatsu no Fukken-Firipin-Kyüshü böeki," Shien 144 (2007/2009): 55-92.
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 For decades, the conventional wisdom has been that the cities' eco
 nomic success was simply and solely a result of foreign parties' exchang
 ing highly priced commodities; in other words, this would mean that
 the city existed only because of its function as a transit port. Sino
 centrists and followers of the California school claim that this sort of
 exchange was a losing deal for the exporting countries and intermedi
 aries, since the silver eventually all ended up in China.20 Thus, Manila
 has been considered nothing more than a way station to China and the
 bullion flows from America were a losing deal for the Spanish.21
 For the Spaniards, as colonial rulers, restricting East Asian partici
 pation in this exchange was not an option, for the latter secured the
 colony's military and general supply.22 Importing military resources
 from China, Portuguese Macau, and Japan was necessary from the ear
 liest days of the colony but became especially important at the begin
 ning of the seventeenth century, when the Spanish were exposed to
 continuous Dutch attacks.23 The Portuguese role in the Manila trade
 was ambiguous: despite logistic interdependence, the Spaniards also
 tried to limit Portuguese interaction as a result of restricting trade at
 Manila. A law of 1593 prohibited Castilians from trading in Macau,
 and Spanish sources furthermore hint at royal decrees that forbade
 Macau traders in Manila. However, these regulations were eased in the
 1620s when Portuguese started to travel from Macau to Manila on a
 regular basis and started to carry huge amounts of silver to China.24
 Since they lacked a permanent base in Manila, they will not be treated
 in this article.
 20 During the Ming period, China's demand for silver increased due to a permanent
 outflow of copper coins. Together with the tax reforms and a stagnating domestic produc
 tion, China became financially dependent on silver imports. For the ideas of those historians
 see Peer Vries, "The California School and Beyond: How to Study the Great Divergence?"
 Journal für Entwicklungspolitik/Austrian Journal of Development Studies 24, no. 4 (2008): 6-49,
 in which he shows that "members" of the California school tend to overlook major insti
 tutional differences between China and the West.
 21 For China as "silver sink" see Flynn and Giráldez, "Born with a Silver Spoon," pp.
 201-221. Andre Gunder Frank, Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age (Berkeley: Uni
 versity of California Press, 1998), pp. 131-165. See also Richard von Glahn, Fountain of
 Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000-1700 (Berkeley: University of Califor
 nia Press, 1996); William S. Atwell, "Another Look at Silver Imports into China, 1635
 1644 "Journal of World History 16, no. 4 (2005): 467-491.
 22 Maria Lourdes Díaz-Trechuelo, Filipinas: La gran desconocida (1565-1898) (Pam
 plona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2001), pp. 71-82.
 23 For a recent study on early modern Japanese military contributions on a global stage
 see Adam Clulow, "European Maritime Violence and Territorial States in Early Modern
 Asia, 1600-1650," Itinerario 33, no. 3 (2009): 72-94.
 24 Schurz, Manila galleon, pp. 110-114; von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, p. 124.
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 Most attractive for Chinese and Japanese merchants who flocked
 together to Manila was that like other port cities around 1600, such
 as Hoi-An in modern Vietnam or Ayutthaya in Thailand, it offered
 them a "neutral setting"25 where they could escape the usual super
 vision of their respective states. Private merchants from both coun
 tries welcomed the opportunity offered by such new trading centers
 outside their native countries, since Japan, despite the legalization of
 Chinese maritime trade in 1567, still remained a nation non grata.
 The Japanese were still prohibited from entering China, while the
 Chinese were likewise not allowed to travel to Japan on official trade
 missions.26 With their regular voyages to the coasts of Luzon, Fujianese
 and Japanese contributed to Manila's urban development from her ear
 liest days. What led them to Manila was personal economic motives,
 indirectly encouraged by their states. Oddly enough, notwithstanding
 the manifold trade patterns and the short-term profits of private traders
 and smugglers, neither Manila nor the three vigorous premodern states
 involved gained much in the long run. Nor did they take lasting advan
 tage of Manila's unprecedented possibilities at the end of the sixteenth
 and the beginning of the seventeenth century. The question is why
 they did not. Having defined premodern Manila's nature, we move on
 to analyzing this main paradox.
 A Multilayered Analysis of the Manila Trade
 around 1600
 Despite being characterized by a central government interested in
 monopolizing power, it seems that neither Spain nor China nor Japan
 tried to channel the obvious profits from the Manila trade into the
 respective state's budget. In spite of the "generative role of the gal
 leons,"27 the economic reality of the early decades was rather disillu
 sioning: merchants had the impression that they could not make the
 most of it, mutual mistrust poisoned the politico-economic climate in
 Manila, and the Philippine economy ended up unable to sustain itself.
 Accordingly, one gets the impression that things had gone wrong.
 25 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, p. 121.
 26 John E. Wills, "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang," in From Ming to
 Ch'ing, ed. Jonathan D. Spence and John E. Wills Jr. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University
 Press, 1979), p. an.
 27 Robert R. Reed, Colonial Manila: The Context of Hispanic Urbanism and Process of
 Morphogenesis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), pp. 27-35.
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 Concerning Manila itself, one is even tempted to conclude that, eco
 nomically speaking, the trilateral relations did more harm than good.
 Policymakers neither made the most of any benefits from the early
 modern market economy nor did they maximize the advantages of hav
 ing access to both transpacific and inter-Asian exchange that undoubt
 edly led to an increase in exchange and consumption. Stressing the
 profitability of long distance trade in luxury goods and the large rev
 enue deriving from such economic activity, Fernand Braudel charac
 terizes the individual groups taking part in early modern long-distance
 trade as entrepreneurs who "chose whatever would maximize [their]
 profits."28 But compared to, for example, "the fantastic rise of Amster
 dam,"29 Manila turned out to be both a mercantilist and a proto-capi
 talist disappointment. By the midst of the seventeenth century, license
 fees and other revenues taken from foreign trade had declined.30 What
 happened? Accordingly, the prevailing view has been that the Spanish
 economic performance in the Philippines was a disaster.31 To a large
 extent that is due to numerous scholars accepting the leyenda negra
 narrative,32 which, as I hope to show, misrepresents the Spanish Crown
 and her subjects as inefficient. Besides, the tendency to look at the
 Philippines in isolation has prevailed up to the present day. It is there
 fore no surprise that the Spanish economic performance in the Philip
 pines has been misinterpreted.
 I believe that the role of the state embedded in global-local dual
 ism was instrumental for port cities like Manila. Economically, neither
 Spain nor China nor Japan benefitted from the Manila trade. Hence
 we have to ask what these three premodern states did or did not do that
 resulted in the failure of Manila to develop into a permanently impor
 28 For Braudel's ideas on long-distance trade as ultimate exchange pattern see Civiliza
 tion and Capitalism, :¡th-¡8th century, vol. 2., The Wheels of Commerce (London: Collins,
 1982), pp. 55-56, 400-428.
 29 Fernand Braudel, Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism (Baltimore:
 Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 26.
 30 See the figures on tribute, almojarifazgo, and other income presented by Luis Alonso,
 one of the few scholars who questioned the early modern Philippines' fiscal debit ("Financ
 ing the Empire," pp. 71-73). In his study he has moreover shown that the idea of the Phil
 ippines being a financial burden for Spain had existed since the earliest colonizing efforts.
 31 Bauzon speaks of a "fiscal nightmare" in Deficit Government, pp. 20-26.
 32 The so-called black legend, a term coined by Julian Juderías in the early twentieth
 century, refers to an anti-Spanish propaganda that dates back into the times of the Revolt
 of the Netherlands in the sixteenth century and experienced several revivals throughout
 history. Such propaganda accused the Spanish of, among other things, ruthlessly spreading
 Catholicism and political tyranny during the reign of Philip II (r. 1556-1598). Joseph Pérez,
 La leyenda negra (Madrid: Gadir Editorial, 2009), pp. 53-139.
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 tant trading hub. Answering this question requires a comparative study
 of their political economies.
 The Local and Central Levels
 OF THE MuLTILAYERED ANALYSIS
 This exploratory article will pinpoint global and local connections
 on a specific geographical stage and seeks to trace Spanish, Chinese,
 and Japanese engagement in Manila by reassessing their commercial
 interactions and various Manila-related trade patterns at the end of
 the "long sixteenth century."33 Accepting the established belief that
 the Spanish-born population of Manila did not benefit from the obvi
 ous riches of the galleon trade, we have to ask: who did? We know
 that Chinese, Japanese, and Portuguese participated—both in legal
 and illegal trade—despite constantly complaining about insufficient
 returns.34 Neither Japanese nor Chinese commercial activities showed
 any signs of serious decline until the beginning of domestic political
 transformations in the 1620s and 1640s, respectively. Revisiting the
 early years in the history of the Spanish colonial capital with a special
 focus on disentangling the various levels of interaction should shed
 light on their complex relations and the dynamics behind them.
 The attitudes and motivations of these three countries toward
 Manila were on the whole different. My point of departure is that the
 striking differences in political economies and culture are very impor
 tant considerations when analyzing the behavior of states.35 In each
 of these three premodern states we find a single hereditary ruler who
 reigned over a specific sovereign territory with a largely agrarian econ
 omy. Governance was supported by sophisticated bureaucratic struc
 33 The study is based on official orders and decrees concerning foreign relations and
 looks at whether or how they affected individual traders, settlers, or other visiting parties.
 34 See Ming Shi-lu, Zhong-yang Yan-jiu yuan, 1610-11-29: "Recently, as trading with
 Japan has been far more profitable than trading with Luzon, some evil persons bribed the
 local officials who issued warrants without authorization, and they went to sea as they
 wished." Geoff Wade, translator, Southeast Asia in the Ming Shi-lu: An Open Access Resource
 (Singapore: Asia Research Institute and the Singapore E-Press, National University of
 Singapore), http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3205/, accessed 1 March 2011. (Henceforth
 cited as Ming Shi-lu.)
 35 I here endorse Adam Smith's classic definition of political economy as "a branch of
 science of a statesman or legislator that proposes to enrich both people and the sovereign."
 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. R. H.
 Campell and A. S. Skinner (Indianapolis: W. B. Todd, 1981), pp. 678-679.
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 tures.36 So we may be tempted to conclude that both economically and
 politically, differences between late sixteenth-century China, Japan,
 and Spain were marginal. However, they seem to increase significantly
 when we take on board the effect of cultural influences and geopolitical
 considerations on their political economies. Multilayered encounters
 in Manila reveal major differences both in mode of governance and the
 institutions that backed their respective political economies. Intrigued
 by this idea of striking differences between the maritime powers of
 the South China Sea, I should briefly compare Spain's, Japan's, and
 China's sixteenth-century presence in Manila before continuing with
 a comparative analysis of their political economies.
 Spain
 Spanish colonial rule in sixteenth-century Southeast Asia was charac
 terized by a very fragile power structure. The Spaniards were engaged
 in endless struggles with indigenous populations to impose rule in the
 archipelago's hinterland. In addition, their sovereignty had already met
 its limits inside Manila, due to demographic weakness. Despite being
 the nominal rulers of the Philippines, from a politico-economic point of
 view and in terms of actual power, with the small number of about two
 thousand Spanish colonizers, Spain was merely one among many actors
 on the Southeast Asian scene. Economic hardship and political transi
 tions in the metropolis as well as constant involvement in hegemonic
 competition in Europe and the Americas enormously complicated the
 position of the overstretched empire. When the conquistadores arrived
 in northern Luzon in 1570, a Muslim clan under Rajah Sulaiman III
 was ruling the Manila Bay area. Intrigued by the small trading port's
 convenient location, which offered access to both the hinterland and
 the maritime trade, the Castilians immediately occupied the territory
 and founded a colonial settlement.37 Within a few years it turned into
 a prosperous port city, attracting the attention of early modern global
 players from China, Japan, as well as Portugal and Northern Europe.
 36 See Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modem World (Berkeley:
 University of California Press, 1991), p. 4.
 37 Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, "Legazpi y la Integración de Filipinas en el Imperio
 Español de Ultramar," in Filipinas, Puerta de Oriente. De Legazpi a Malaspina, ed. Alfredo
 José Morales Martínez (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal para Acción Cultural Exterior, 2003), pp.
 49-66.
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 Manila thus became part and parcel of the emerging world economy.38
 After his hopes to find an abundance of spices or precious metals were
 frustrated soon after landing on the archipelago in 1565, the first gov
 ernor of the Spanish colony, Miguel López de Legazpi (r. 1569-1572),
 was of the opinion that only the trade in Chinese silks could make up
 for the failure to create a monopoly on the spice trade and therefore
 proposed this strategy to his king.39
 After Andrés de Urdaneta and his crew eventually succeeded in
 finding a return route (tornaviage) via the Pacific to Mexico, cargos
 with provisions and silver were annually sent from Acapulco to Manila
 until 1815—that is, just before Mexico gained independence from
 Spain. With the huge bullion flows that reached Southeast Asia after
 the discovery of the transpacific route and the establishment of a regu
 lar transport network between the two coastal colonial outposts, the
 Spanish in the Philippines were able to quench China's thirst for silver
 but at the same time had difficulties maintaining the colony and were
 far from achieving what a few individuals dreamt of: neither Spanish
 rule nor the Catholic faith were noticeably spread beyond the archi
 pelago's borders.40 The fact that it did not accomplish any initial impe
 rial goals in the East has often led to the conclusion that Spain had
 ignored Manila's obvious qualities as an emporium for transcontinental
 trade. This, however, is a one-dimensional argument. The Spanish may
 have been short-sighted in economic affairs, but what they missed most
 in the Philippines was simply the people who could carry out elabo
 rate jobs. For instead of taking advantage of maritime Asia's economic
 conditions, the territorial colonial model—which had just been suc
 cessfully tested in the Americas—was uncritically applied to the Phil
 ippines despite the far greater distance between the Philippines and
 the motherland. As with the Americas, early steps in colonizing the
 region were achieved by missionary efforts and the administrative and
 educational contributions of the friars, who were not only the first but
 38 For Asian and European contributions to Southeast Asian port cities' florescence
 see Leonard Y. Andaya, "Interactions with the Outside World and Adaptation in Southeast
 Asian Society 1500-1800," in The Cambridge University of Southeast Asia c. 1500-c. 1800,
 vol. i, part II, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.
 1-57
 39 Andaya, "Interactions," p. 13.
 40 What shaped this narrative was Governor Francisco Sande's (r. 1575-1580) bold
 plan of the year 1576 to conquer China with a force no larger than six thousand men, as
 well as restless attempts by Padre Alonso Sanchez to establish missionary posts in China.
 See Archivo General de Indias (henceforth cited as AGI) Filipinas 6, r. 3, n. 26, "Carta de
 Sande sobre corsario Limajón, reino de Taibin, etc." (7 June 1576).
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 also the most committed Spanish settlers of the Philippines.41 Because
 of frequent natural disasters, such as fires and earthquakes, seasoned
 Spanish town planners were not able to build a solid town until the
 seventeenth century. Despite residential restrictions imposed by the
 ruling Spaniards, the tens of thousands natives, Chinese, and Japanese
 who settled around the city walls were integrated well into the urban
 structure. From the very beginning, Manila's settler continuity relied
 on migration from East Asia as well as logistical support from outside.
 After the native population of the archipelago, people from China—
 including visiting and hibernating merchants and sailors, as well as
 long-term residents and immigrants—represented by far the hugest
 ethnic group in Manila.42
 Without doubt, the influx of cheap silk to the American markets
 was the most obvious contribution of the Philippines to the Overseas
 Empire.43 Bought in Manila, brought back by the Manila galleon, and
 distributed at American fairs, Chinese silk was just as much a global
 commodity as American silver. Spanish government documents show
 that silk industry losses had the potential of turning into a fundamen
 tal problem for the Crown. Therefore this trade pattern was not wel
 comed by all. Merchants and economic groups back home as well as
 in Mexico often protested against this unfair competition. More silk
 from Asia meant decreasing sales figures for the silk from the moth
 erland. Since whole regions in Granada and Valencia depended eco
 nomically on the export of silk to the Americas, the importation of
 Chinese silks seriously harmed the local Spanish and Mexican industry
 and at times even caused bankruptcy.44 The influx of cheap Chinese
 silk therefore simply was not compatible with the existing transatlantic
 system.45 When those living from the sericulture business started caus
 41 Maria Lourdes Diaz-Trechuelo, "The Role of the Chinese in the Philippine Domestic
 Economy (1570-1770)," in The Chinese in the Philippines 1570-1770, vol. 1, ed. Alonso
 Felix Jr. (Manila: Solidaridad, 1966), pp. 206-208.
 42 See also n. 7.
 43 Reed, Colonial Manila, p. 30.
 44 Archivo General de Simancas, PTR. LEG. 89, doc. 298, "Memorial del Reino pidi
 endo la prohibición de la importación de seda de China y Persia" (August 1617).
 45 The exact amount of Chinese silk that entered the Americas in the late sixteenth
 and early seventeenth centuries is hard to calculate. In 1598 Francisco de Tello (r. 1596
 1602), governor of the Philippines, remarked in a letter to King Philip 11 that the Chinese
 merchants who came to Manila to trade, sold cheap silk for the total amount of eight hun
 dred thousand to 1 million pesos. We also know that during the first decade of the seven
 teenth century two or three boxes of Chinese silk were sold for one thousand pesos. Yet, by
 the 1620s, increasing competition with the Dutch caused prices to double, and merchants
 were often reported to complain about a shortage in Chinese raw silk for the manufactures
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 ing a period of constant social movements and civil protest,46 the cen
 tral government had to take action. Considering Spain's involvement
 in European affairs and uprisings on the peninsula, it will come as no
 surprise that the king favored peace and military support at home over
 economic gains in faraway places—a situation that made it difficult
 to react to changing demands within the vast overseas empire. Peru's
 banning of direct trade with Manila has to be understood as a measure
 against the colonial society in the Americas that was feared to become
 economically independent from the Spanish motherland.47 Competi
 tion among merchants of the overseas empire should be understood
 against this background. Although local Spanish merchants in Manila
 were in theory protected by the boleta system of the galleon trade, Mex
 ican merchants were in practice in a privileged position thanks to their
 direct access to silver.48
 China
 For an accurate assessment of China's presence in Manila, it is crucial
 to distinguish between official Ming China and the aforementioned
 local groups from Fujian. On the one hand, official relations had
 existed since the early days of the Ming dynasty, when China's tradi
 tional tributary system became intertwined with economic and social
 developments in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, we find a huge
 group of so-called overseas Chinese who navigated the South China
 Sea, reaching ports in Luzon and Cebu long before the arrival of the
 Europeans.49 Several historians as well as social scientists have shown
 that Chinese private foreign trade increased as a consequence of the
 in New Spain. See The Philippine Islands 1493-1898, ed. Emma Helen Blair and James Alex
 ander Robertson, 55 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, 1905), 10:179. Taking von Glahn's
 silver figures of approximately 5 million pesos (127,800 kilograms), this would mean that
 about one fifth of the American silver was spent on silk. The impressive size of the silk
 market in Manila, which spread over four large buildings, gives further evidence for the
 profitability of the silk trade. See Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 7:220.
 46 Spain suffered from the expulsion of the Moriscos as well as regional autonomy
 movements during the reign of King Philip III (r. 1598-1621).
 47 AGI, Filipinas 339, 1. 2, f. 7or - 7ir, "Orden al Virrey de Peru sobre prohibicion de
 comercio" (11 January 1593).
 48 For a synthesis of Manila's integration in long-distance commerce see Katharine
 Bjork, "The Link That Kept the Philippines Spanish: Mexican Merchant Interests and the
 Manila Trade, 1571-1815," Journal of World History 9 (1998): 51-88.
 49 William Henry Scott, Barangay. Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society
 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994).
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 country's pressing need for silver as a means of payment during the
 sixteenth century, in particular the effects of the Single-Whip reform.
 This change in China's fiscal system, which implied that in principle
 all land taxes be paid in silver, is regarded as a turning point in world
 history, for it integrated China into the emerging global economy.50
 According to moderate estimates, one hundred thousand kilograms of
 silver left Manila for China annually at the turn of the sixteenth cen
 tury. In light of this, Manila's role in the late Ming's economic history
 will become clearer. As a reaction to the necessity of importing ever
 greater amounts of silver, the Ming government eventually suspended
 the official prohibition on foreign maritime trade in 1567, and a cer
 tain number of licensed trading vessels would soon be sent to Luzon.51
 Since official foreign trade remained strictly controlled thereafter, only
 a minor part of the formerly illicit trade activities in the South and
 East China Sea region was absorbed by it. Due to both licensed and
 illegal silver imports to China, several hundred Fujianese traders trav
 eled to Manila annually after 1571, and it was not only the silver that
 lured them. Fujianese traders had participated actively in inter-Asian
 trade for a long time and could rely on an already existing widespread
 trading network in East and Southeast Asia. This explains why soon
 after Spanish reign was established over the archipelago, the colony's
 first governor, Miguel de Legazpi, informed King Philip II about Chi
 nese junks calling on ports in Luzon.52 In that respect it will not come
 as a big surprise that they became the real colonizers of Manila. Dur
 ing the sixteenth century, people from several regions of coastal China
 emigrated from economic pressures such as poverty,53 a hardship they
 would not suffer in Manila, where the Chinese community would come
 to dominate the majority of the business sectors, ranging from retail
 to the building and service industries.54 When the number of immi
 50 William Atwell, "Ming China and the Emerging World Economy, c. 1470-1650," in
 The Cambridge History of China: The Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644, ed. Denis C. Twitchett and
 Frederick W. Mote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 416.
 51 Von Glahn, Fountain of Fortune, pp. 119-123. Over the decades, studies on early
 modern silver flows have led to controversial results and debates due to the scarcity of reli
 able quantitative data.
 52 Cited in Reed, Colonial Manila, p. 31.
 53 For the economic importance of the sixteenth-century southern Chinese diaspora
 see Wang Gungwu, "The China Seas: Becoming an Enlarged Mediterranean," in The East
 Asian 'Mediterranean': Maritime Crossroads of Culture, Commerce and Human Migration, ed.
 Angela Schottenhammer (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, 2008), pp. 7-22.
 54 Alberto Santamaria, OP, "The Chinese Parian (El Parian de los Sangleyes)," in The
 Chinese in the Philippines 1570-1770, ed. Alonso Felix Jr. (Manila: Solidaridad, 1966), p.
 90: Governor Dasmarinas writing in a letter to King Philip II, 1591: "Within the city is the
 silk-market of the Parian where the Chinese merchants trade. They have 200 stores, which
 probably employ more than 2,000 Chinese."
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 grant Chinese sangleyes—a pejorative term used by the Spaniards for
 members of Fujianese merchant communities that originated from a
 mispronunciation of chang lai (those who come frequently) or shang
 lai (those who come to trade)55—had reached several thousands, they
 were assigned their own quarter, the Parian, in the early 1580s.56 How
 ever, many Chinese merchants and artisans retained their shops within
 the city itself.
 It is small wonder that the scales of interdependence between Euro
 peans and Chinese soon tipped under the weight of increasing influ
 ence wielded by the Chinese.57 Fear of the huge number of Chinese
 immigrants seemed to prove right when the colony experienced its first
 military attack from the sea. In the year 1574, a group of pirates led by
 Lin Feng launched an attack on Manila, after their attempts to take
 over parts of the Guangdong coast and Hainan Island had been frus
 trated. The story of Lin Feng, who would be erroneously recorded in
 European sources as Limahon, has mostly been presented as a unique
 story of an evil Chinese outlaw who tried to conquer the young Span
 ish settlement in Manila with his fellow pirates. The dominant dis
 course stressed the Castilians' heroic defense of what they considered
 their property and territory. According to European records, the Span
 ish commander Juan de Salcedo and his men defeated Lin Feng's pirate
 force of seventy ships and more than three thousand invaders, before
 a fleet under Wang Wangguo was sent from China—where Lin Feng
 and his fellow pirates had long been fruitlessly chased—to support the
 Spanish.58 Recent research carried out by Igawa Kenji, who added an
 East Asian perspective by scrutinizing Chinese records, has brought to
 light Lin Feng's incorporation into wakö networks.59 What is interest
 ing about Lin Feng's attempt to conquer Manila is not the actual mili
 tary threat but its long-lasting impact on Castilian collective memory
 and anti-Chinese propaganda trans- and cis-pacific.60
 55 See Manuel Ollé, La Empresa de China (Barcelona: Acantilado, 2002), pp. 244, 263.
 56 Records on the establishment of the first parían vary between 1579 and 1581. In the
 course of the seventeenth century Chinese settlements increased so that one could find dif
 ferent parians in the surroundings of Manila.
 57 Leonard Blussé van Oud-Alblas, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women
 and the Dutch in VOC Batavia (Leiden: Brill, 1986), p. 78.
 58 Ollé, Empresa, p. 56
 59 Igawa Kenji, "At the Crossroads: Limahon and Wako in Sixteenth Century Philip
 pines," in Elusive Pirates, Pervasive Smugglers. Violence and Clandestine Trade in the Greater
 China Seas, ed. Robert J. Anthony (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2010), p. 80.
 60 Edward R. Slack, "Sinifying New Spain. Cathay's Influence on Colonial Mexico via
 the Nao de China," in The Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean, ed. Walton Look Lai
 and Tan Chee-Beng (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 7-34. Even in Mexico Lin Feng's defeat was
 solemnly commemorated.
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 Yet it was not only external attacks that jeopardized relations
 between the European colonial capital and Chinese settlers. Over the
 years, frictions between Chinese settlers and the governing body led
 to tensions and distrust, which at times erupted into violent uprisings.
 A whole series of incidents started with the assassination of governor
 Gomez Perez Dasmariñas (r. 1590-1593) and other Spaniards by Chi
 nese rowers employed on one of the Spanish imperial enterprises to
 the Moluccas in 1593.61 This mutiny had its origins in Chinese ill feel
 ing about being forced to work on the galleys. By 1596 governing the
 high number of Chinese settlers in Manila had become so challenging
 that colonial authorities were left with no other option than expel the
 majority of sangleyes.62 In reality, this measure did not materialize, and
 social peace remained fragile.
 The situation eventually escalated in 1603. In that year, tensions
 increased even further in reaction to the arrival of three mandarins
 searching for the legendary gold mountains of Cavite, a move misinter
 preted as a sign for a possible and long-feared Chinese invasion. When
 a fire broke out in the Chinese Parian, fate took its course. Much has
 been written on the subsequent uprising of the Chinese and the severe
 punishment handed out by the Spaniards, who were accused of having
 slaughtered several thousand people. It is hard to ascertain what exactly
 happened, for accounts on the event differ largely depending on the
 standpoint of the authors.63 The Spanish are reported to have burnt the
 Chinese silk market, the alcaiceria,64 in the heat of the moment, after
 having noticed that inhabitants of the neighborhood were preparing
 for an attack. During the following weeks, joint Spanish-Filipino and
 Japanese forces supposedly killed between fifteen thousand and thirty
 thousand Chinese.65 Despite the circulation of such figures in both
 Chinese and Western circles, there is no concrete evidence to sup
 port such huge numbers. First and foremost, we do not know the exact
 figure of Fujianese settlers in 1603. Even if it had doubled the officially
 61 Quoted from José Eugenio Borao, "The Massacre of 1603: Chinese Perception of the
 Spanish on the Philippines," Itinerario 23, no. 1 (1998): 24.
 62 Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 9:266.
 63 AGI Filipinas 7, r. i,n. 12, "Carta de Acuña sobre sublevación de sangleyes, gal
 eras" (8 August 1603); AGI, Filipinas 35, n. 68, "Carta de Juan de Bustamante sobre la
 sublevación de los sangleyes" (18 December 1603); AGI, Filipinas, 19, r.6, n. 91, "Carta de
 audiencia sobre asuntos de gobierno" (30 June 1605).
 64 AGI, Filipinas 84, n. 118, "Carta del cabildo eclasiástico de Manila sobre suble
 vación de sangleyes" (11 December 1603).
 65 AGI, Filipinas 7, r. 1, n. 28, "Carta de Acuña al virrey de Ucheo sobre castigo a
 sangleyes" (August 1605).
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 permitted number of six thousand and if we take into account several
 hundred visiting merchants, we could not reach such a high number.
 Given insufficient ammunition the Spanish population would, despite
 Japanese and Filipino support, not have had the means for such a dras
 tic punishment. So where do these numbers come from? My estimation
 is that they originate from three concurring factors: the Castilian side
 exaggerated the number for the sake of demonstrating military supe
 riority, the Chinese side indulged in playing the role of victim, and
 other hostile parties of the Spanish, such as the Dutch, welcomed such
 exorbitant numbers for their anti-Spanish propaganda.
 What we know for certain is that after these dreadful events the
 Spanish colony in Manila for months suffered under the collapse of the
 entire network of supply that was built on sangley merchants and manu
 facturers.66 Fujianese immigrants had long been accepted as the eco
 nomic pillar of the colony and consequently were welcomed to resettle
 the Parian and to return to their previous occupations because the
 Spanish needed the networks reestablished.67 By 1606, 1,500 resident
 permits had been issued again, and another source registers 6,533 v's''
 tors from China in the same year.68 After only a few years, things had
 returned to normal and, just as prior to 1603, the Chinese would cater
 to the needs of intramuros, by producing clothes in the latest Spanish
 fashion and baking the daily bread. In addition, craftsmen back home
 in Fujian and Canton contributed to quench the new American elite's
 thirst for luxury items, which were especially appreciated for their good
 69
 price.
 The other side of the coin of the 1603 events is that the Ming
 emperor let down his expatriates and refused to avenge the unrigh
 teousness that had happened to them. Spanish sources indicated that
 an official Chinese statement on the events was sent to Manila from
 Fujian. In this letter the emperor threatened the Spanish that they
 would send a large fleet to Manila unless the value of the goods carried
 there by Chinese merchants in 1603 was returned to them.70 However,
 66 AGI, Filipinas 27, n. 48, "Carta de la ciudad de Manila sobre comercio, japoneses ...
 etc." (9 July 1604).
 67 AGI, Filipinas 74, n. 58, "Testimonio de Luis de Salinas sobre sangleyes" (15 June
 1606); Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 14:151, 189-191.
 68 Díaz-Trechuelo, "Role of tbe Chinese," p. 184.
 69 Chuan, "Chinese Silk," p. 249.
 70 AGI, Filipinas 7, r. 1., n. 28, "Carta de Acuña al virrey de Ucheo sobre castigo a
 sangleyes" (August 1605).
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 there was no mention of the civil losses. The Son of Heaven consid
 ered the settlers of these overseas communities subjects of the rulers
 of Luzon rather than people of China. To the upset Fujianese local
 authorities, the emperor made clear that he would not wage war for the
 sake of ordinary merchants, even less to avenge something that had
 happened outside China.71 The emperor's only reaction was to ask the
 audiencia, the highest court in Manila, to serve up justice72—a request
 that illuminates that Ming China had a different idea of its role in
 foreign affairs.
 In light of central China's half-hearted and hesitant reactions to
 the events in Manila, I have to disagree strongly with Edward Slack's
 estimation that without Japanese military assistance—although
 we can only speculate as to the motives behind it, such as compe
 tition between Japanese and Chinese merchants, or pent-up hostility
 after Hideyoshi's unsuccessful Korea invasion or even fear of Span
 ish repressions—"Sangleyes would surely have made the Philippines a
 colony of the Middle Kingdom."73 Neither the merchants themselves
 nor the central rulers tried to politically integrate mercantile outposts
 into China.
 Japan
 It is now time to turn to Japan's role in the Manila trade, which has too
 often been overlooked. Fully grasping the complexity of the entangle
 ments at the end of the late sixteenth century, without considering
 Japanese activities, however, is impossible. As with Ming China, the
 Japanese presence in Manila was characterized by the dualism of local
 and central interests. Japan's entry into Southeast Asia is closely inter
 twined with China's economic history. When Japan's tributary trade
 relations with China ended in the 1530s, Japanese traders had to find
 new ways to take part in maritime trade. Soon piracy and smuggling
 carried out by merchant adventurers—commonly referred to as wako—
 71 Quoted from Borao, "Massacre," p. 33.
 72 AGI, Filipinas 74, n. 60, "Testimonio de memoriales de Benavides sobre sangleyes"
 (7 July 1605).
 73 Edward R. Slack Jr., "The Chinos in New Spain: A Corrective Lens for a Distorted
 Image," Journal of World History 20, no. 1 (2009): 50. In his long overdue effort to bring
 light into the immigration of Fujianese onboard the Manila galleons to Mexico, this author
 regrettably blinds out the different levels of the local and the central in these intercultural
 processes.
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 reemerged. During the days of political and economic transformation
 at the end of the civil war period around the middle of the sixteenth
 century, they seized the opportunity to merge with southbound Chinese
 traders for joint operations.74 By supporting these merchant groups,
 Japanese local lords, daimyö, seeking to extend their political influence,
 became acquainted with the Europeans in the South China Sea. In
 the course of the subsequent decades of nanban trade—as the Japanese
 called their commercial intercourse with the "barbarians" located south
 of Japan—regular trade patterns of both local and central origin came
 into existence.75 Local lords of the southern island, Kyüshü, were the
 first to make advances in establishing regular ties with the Spanish in
 the Philippines, thus becoming an integrated part of the Manila trade
 in the 1580s.76 Committed to establishing business relations, Iberian
 missionaries were welcomed in Japan, and, in return, local merchants
 were given access to European-dominated ports. Roughly at the same
 time, a Spanish force expelled a group of Japanese outlaws and seafarers
 who had established a small settlement in Cagayan, northern Luzon.77
 This encounter would forever taint the official Spanish perception of
 Japanese merchants.
 On a central level, in 1588 the leading unifier of Warring States
 Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (r. 1582-1598), passed a law against pri
 vateering in the South China Sea. Succeeding Tokugawa rulers reen
 forced similar laws after rising to power in 1600. The most prominent
 measure taken in order to control foreign trade was the introduction
 of passes showing the ruler's vermillion seal—shuinjö. Only merchant
 ships equipped with a seal from the central bakufu government were
 74 Japanese historiography has pointed to the fact that in most cases the majority of
 wakö were of Chinese origin. There is widespread evidence that such multiethnic mer
 chant groups collaborated to pursue their business in the Philippines. For example, Legazpi's
 mentioning of both Chinese and Japanese settlers upon the arrival of the Spanish. Other
 Spanish sources relate that merchants who came to Manila to sell weapons were vassals of
 the "king" of Hirado: See AGI Filipinas 18 A, r. 5, n. 31 "Carta de Vera sobre situación,
 comercio . . . japoneses etc." (26 June 1587). In addition, Japanese historians have shown
 that Kyushu daimyö traditionally supported these illicit traders since gains from maritime
 trade were important income for their domains. For a recent study see Adam Clulow, "From
 Global Entrepot to Early Modern Domain: Hirado, 1609-1641," Monumento Nipponica 65,
 no. i (2010): 1-35.
 75 For a synthesis of Tokugawa Japan's trade with Southeast Asia see Victor Lieberman,
 Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830, vol. 2, Mainland Mirrors:
 Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
 Press, 2009), pp. 420-428.
 76 Iwao, Nanyö Nihonmachi, pp. 249-260.
 77 Juan Gil, Hidalgos y Samurais, España y Japón en los Siglos XVI y XVII (Madrid:
 Alianza, 1991), pp. 23-24.
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 allowed to sell their goods in Southeast Asian ports. Luzon was among
 the most popular vermillion seal trading ships' destinations during the
 first two decades of the Tokugawa reign.78 An average of two or three
 vessels supported the colony annually with military and nutritional
 necessities. Regular exchange between the two Pacific archipelagos
 encouraged many Japanese of different social backgrounds to make a
 living in Manila. According to Charles Boxer, the Japanese enjoyed a
 much greater freedom of trade at Manila than did the Chinese.79 How
 ever, a closer look suggests the opposite. They were also assigned their
 own district in Dilao under the Franciscans' missionary supervision in
 1585,80 and contrary to previous assumptions they were not exempted
 from paying the poll tax to the royal treasury.81
 What is most crucial to consider here is that roughly at the same
 time as silver output in the Americas peaked, Japan became the world's
 largest exporter of silver to China.82 The bulk of Japanese silver depos
 its entered China via Portuguese Macau thanks to the annual voyage of
 the "black ship" to Nagasaki. This brings into question the chief moti
 vation for Japanese seagoing merchants to head toward Manila. Two
 hypothetical answers may be considered. The first and easy one hints
 at access to the Chinese market. But reality was far more complex.
 Analyzing Japan's early modern presence in Manila requires disentan
 gling economic and political factors. Indeed, in economic terms, it was
 access to Chinese silk that led both private merchants and govern
 ing bodies to invest in voyages to Manila.83 Studying shipping records
 shows that exports from the Philippines to Japan consisted mainly of
 Chinese raw and manufactured silks, with rare European items, deer
 skin, and aromatic woods making up the difference.84
 The second hypothetical answer, however, goes far beyond mere
 78 Nagazumi Yöko, Shuinsen (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Köun, 2001), p. 4.
 79 Charles R. Boxer, The Great Ship from Amacon: Annals of Macao and the Old Japan
 Trade, 1555-1640 (Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Históricos Ultramarinos, 1963), p. 73.
 80 AGI, Filipinas 77, n. 9, "Carta del Cabildo eclesiástico de Manila sobre varios asun
 tos" (10 July 1599). For the several Japanese residential areas in Manila see Shimizu Yüko,
 "Nihon Supein dankö (1624) no saikentö: Edo bakufu 'sakoku' taisaku no keisei katei,"
 Rekishigaku kenkyü 5 (2009): 1-16.
 81 Around the year 1600, 218 tributes were collected from Japanese households in
 Manila. See Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 27:79, 135.
 82 See Murai Shosuke, Umi kara Mita Sengoku Nihon (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinso, 1997),
 pp. 153-163.
 83 Archivum Romanum Societatis lesu (ARSI) Jap/Sin 32, f. 3 v - f. 4. This question
 naire of testimonies of the "San Felipe" incident also proves the economic importance of
 silk from Manila.
 84 Tsükö Ichiran, ed. Hayashi Akira (Osaka: Seibundö, 1967), 179: 575.
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 economic reasons and includes aspects of late sixteenth-century pro
 cesses of state formation based on diplomacy as a means of creating
 legitimacy.85 In terms of foreign relations, Japan remained rather invis
 ible until the second half of the sixteenth century. Beginning with the
 reign of Hideyoshi, who challenged the Spanish self-perception, this
 would promptly change. Japan's aggressive external approach under
 the administration of the imperial commander (kanpaku86) Hideyoshi,
 including his infamous military plots against Korea and Ming China
 in 1592 and 1598, stands in sharp contrast to the Tokugawa foreign
 policy. The early Tokugawa shoguns succeeded in repositioning the
 country in international affairs, thanks to elaborate diplomatic tactics.
 What these two different approaches had in common, however, was a
 strong desire to abandon the cosmos of the Chinese Middle Kingdom
 by establishing a Japan-centered system. In terms of foreign trade, one
 must not forget that several regulative measures that only materialized
 under the Tokugawa, such as the set of rules for shuinsen trade, were
 first tested by Hideyoshi.87
 The emerging Manila-based intercontinental trade suggests that
 the political and social entanglements of these three premodern states
 were far more complex than previously assumed. Bullion shipments
 from Acapulco were not the only driving forces supporting economic
 developments. In this respect it is crucial to distinguish between two
 things: the dynamics of the Manila galleon trade linking Asia with
 the Americas and Europe, on the one hand, and the economic per
 formance of the multicultural urban community that—although often
 overshadowed by the bullion trade—gradually became the foundation
 of the Manila system, on the other hand.
 For a better understanding of the far-reaching processes we should
 recall that conditions changed substantially in Japan as a result of the
 establishment of a Dutch trading post in Hirado in 1609. As a further
 step, anti-Christian laws were enacted in 1612 and 1614, and Japan's
 state relations with the Portuguese of Macau and the Spanish of Manila
 began to decline. In 1624, after several attempts to kick out Spanish
 missionaries, Tokugawa Japan officially broke ties with the Castilians
 in the Philippines.
 85 For Tokugawa Japan's altering course in foreign policies after the 1630s see Ronald
 Toby, State and Diplomacy in Early Modem Japan: Asia in the Development of the Tokugawa
 Bakufu (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991).
 86 IIÉ3 chief advisor to the emperor.
 87 Nagazumi, Shuinsen, pp. 2-5.
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 The Strikingly Different Political Economies
 behind the Manila System
 Cross-examining the triangular Manila trade from both a European and
 an East Asian angle shows that none of the involved parties had the
 potential to turn the city into an ever-growing trading hub. In this light
 it should be easy to accept either that Spain, as well as China and Japan,
 had major difficulties to take advantage of Manila or that Manila had
 a hidden shortcoming. Manila's paradox becomes much easier to com
 prehend in the light of the three premodern states' political economies.
 Crucial aspects of their attitudes, motivations, and actions toward the
 Manila trade shall be systematically discussed below.
 First, between 1565 and 1640, China had no long-lasting maritime
 trading institutions. Not only did the state mostly prohibit private
 profit-oriented external trade, but also it failed to encourage profit
 maximizing measures for the sake of the imperial treasury. On the
 Spanish side the situation differed in the sense that economic poli
 cies more elaborate than simply restricting trade were developed out of
 necessity. However, since most of these policies fell into the category
 of interventionism that had the ultimate objective of adding to the
 royal treasury, one may argue that the two states were more alike than
 previously assumed. As early as 1582, the Crown began to set limits for
 the galleon trade by prohibiting the maritime linkage between Peru
 and the Philippines.88 In the wake of such economic interventionism,
 the king was advised to introduce regulating decrees for the voyages
 of the Manila galleon in 1587 and 1593, with the aim of limiting the
 quantity of cargo and the amount of individual investment. These
 attempts favored the economic interests of Spanish settlers in Manila
 who feared competition from visiting entrepreneurs from the Ameri
 cas.89 Yet, a gap between theory and reality continued to exist, while
 smuggling and corruption boomed.
 The Japanese state, in turn, applied a combination of policies that
 showed elements of the policies of Habsburg Spain and Ming China.
 After 1600, the Tokugawa rulers were extraordinarily efficient in reap
 ing the benefits of state-controlled foreign trade policies but less con
 cerned about individual merchants' rights.90 When recalling the events
 88 Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 8:316-318.
 89 Reed, Colonial Manila, p. 30.
 90 Murakami Naojirö, Ikoku Nikki Shö (Tokyo: Sanshüsha, 1929), p. 46; see also Tsükö,
 179: 569-57°
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 of 1603, we get the impression that Chinese merchants were the only
 group that lacked legal protection from their motherland.
 The relationship between each country's domestic policies and
 their financial gains from Manila warrants a closer look. Here again,
 we can trace similarities in the Spanish attitude and Ming China's
 denial of free foreign trade in favor of national security, and we there
 fore may conclude that Crown intervention played a part in hinder
 ing free economic development in both countries. In all aspects of the
 Manila trade, the main difference between the East Asian polities and
 Spain lies in the fact that Spanish restrictions for the Manila trade
 were encouraged not so much by the Crown's direct self-interest but
 rather by the pressure from other stakeholders in the motherland.
 Although we do not know the exact size for the silver flows across
 the Pacific, from the perspective of Manila's commercial florescence
 it was crucial that China had easy access to huge amounts of silver, as
 this encouraged merchants from both Fujian and Haicheng to partici
 pate actively in trade in Southeast Asia. In short, in the first decades
 of the seventeenth century, official trade between Manila and mari
 time China peaked with an annual silver import total of more than
 one hundred thousand kilograms.91 Contemporary sources show that
 government restriction could not prevent the outflow of silver, so that
 far into the eighteenth century, more than 1 million pesos in circu
 lating currency left Manila annually.92 Thus the idea of losing silver
 to the Chinese caused headaches in all corners of the Spanish over
 seas empire. Royal authorities in Manila came to realize that dealing
 with the Chinese was not lucrative for the colony, in that in return for
 silver they only received silk and ceramics of low quality.93 The high
 demand for Chinese products in all Spanish colonies however was not
 exactly an indicator that Spanish merchants would encounter perma
 nent losses. Nevertheless it implies that from the perspective of the
 metropolis financial gains disappeared for the state.
 91 After 1588, merchants from Haicheng and Fujian received licenses for trade with
 Southeast Asia. Luzon was among the most popular destinations. From 1588 onward,
 between thirty and forty licenses were annually issued for Luzon. See von Glahn, Fountain
 of Fortune, p. 119; see also p. 123: "In 1611-12, Chinese vessels accounted for 91.5 per cent
 of the total customs revenue collected at Manila, a telling indication of the Chinese domi
 nance in the Philippine market."
 92 Unknown author, "Manila Mai Governada" (between 1700 and 1768).
 93 Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 6:279-280. The Spanish at Manila com
 plained that only a very small amount of the silver sent from the Americas stayed in the
 Philippines, while the settlers of Mexico complained about the bad quality of Chinese silk
 products, which would cause price dumping.
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 Thus by considering the constant overseas Spanish demand for
 Chinese silk, we may conclude that parts of the Spanish overseas
 empire were as keen on Chinese precious goods as the Chinese were
 on American silver. However, Ming China did not take advantage of
 the Spaniards' negative "balance of trade."94 Instead, the Ming state
 lost potential profits to scorned private traders and never made serious
 attempts to turn the tables for the sake of the imperial treasury. This
 was by no means exceptional in Ming economic policy. With regard
 to the profitable exchange of silver and raw silk between Japan and
 China, the Japanese historian Nakajima recently hinted at gains made
 by Chinese and Japanese smugglers around the mid sixteenth century
 before the profits fell in the hands of Portuguese intermediaries who
 institutionalized silk and silver exchange between Macau and Naga
 saki. He furthermore points out that both the Ming and Toyotomi
 regimes failed to generate huge direct profits from this exchange of
 their most precious commodities.95 Nakajima indirectly suggests that
 the lack of regulating mechanisms, such as laws that defined and insti
 tutions that supervised commercial exchange, harmed the "national
 economies" of China and Japan at the time. Whereas central Japan
 found a way to benefit economically from the lucrative trading envi
 ronment in the Southern Seas, in Ming China the absence of state
 level maritime activities continued to exist because the empire lacked
 interest in organizing trade beyond the tally system.
 A further key aspect in analyzing the role of the state in Manila
 related policies is diplomatic exchange, best illustrated by the politi
 cal transitions in Japan. Hideyoshi's ambitious foreign policies have
 already been mentioned. In his correspondence with Manila, he
 addressed three letters to the governor-general of the Philippines and
 the king of Spain.96 In 1592 and 1593, he sent his ambassador Harada
 Kiyemon to Manila, warning the Spanish governor about his enormous
 might and his intention to conquer the Philippines unless the Spanish
 paid tribute to Japan.97 Despite constant mutual embassies,98 relations
 94 There is a huge debate going on whether "balance of trade" can be used in the
 modern sense of the word, while others discuss whether silver should be considered as a
 commodity or a currency.
 95 Nakajima Gakushö (pre-conference paper for the First Congress of the Asian Asso
 ciation of World Historians, Osaka, 2009), p. 3.
 96 AGI, Filipinas 18b, r. 2, n. 12, "Carta de G. P. Mariftas enviando cartas de Japón"
 (11 June 1592).
 97 Ibid.
 98 The Castilian envoys were headed by Juan Cobo in 1592 and by Pedro Bautista one
 year later.
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 on an official level were jeopardized by various misunderstandings. In
 1596 this culminated into a tragic episode of Spanish-Japanese rela
 tions: the so-called San Felipe incident—the events that followed the
 shipwrecking of a Manila galleon on the coast of japan. Misunder
 standings and arrogance on both sides caused a stir among the Span
 ish crew and Japanese officials. When an increasing number of Japan
 based Europeans and newly converted Japanese became involved in
 the conflict, Hideyoshi—who had already issued a ban on Christianity
 in 1587—felt impelled to bear down on the intruding Spaniards and
 the spread of Christianity. The following year, twenty-six Catholics,
 including barefoot Franciscan friars from Manila and native Japanese—
 were executed in Nagasaki and became known as the first martyrs on
 Japanese soil." Despite a further embassy under Luis de Navarrete, who
 endowed Hideyoshi with rich presents (that legendarily even included
 an elephant) relations with the Spaniards did not recover until Hidey
 oshi's death in 1598.100
 Thereafter, the Tokugawa bakufu (1603-1867) established its
 political supremacy in Japan, based on the bakuhan system that has
 often been referred to as centralized feudalism, for 250 years. The first
 three shoguns of this era were particularly instrumental in centralizing
 power and determining the country's foreign policies. They focused on
 restricting power at the local level. Concerning the Manila trade, it is
 of particular interest that daimyö were no longer allowed to deal with
 foreign powers nor undertake military action without authorization.
 Instead, they had to commit their "political resources" to the bakufu by
 supporting official projects and submitting information.101
 On a diplomatic level, Tokugawa Ieyasu was quick to take steps to
 establish friendly relations with the Castilians. One of the first things
 he did to appease the Spanish at Manila was reissue a ban on piracy.
 In 1601 he sent the Franciscan friar Jerónimo de Jesús as an envoy to
 the Spanish governor, assuring him of his intention to establish regular
 trade relations with the Philippines and New Spain. In a letter of 1602,
 Ieyasu introduced the shuinjö system, as well as his wish to establish
 relations with New Spain.102 In 1605, Spanish traders received offi
 99 Antonio de Morga, Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas (Manila: Ateneo de Manila, 2008),
 pp. 78-84.
 100 Blair and Robertson, Philippine Islands, 10:170-171.
 101 Oishi Shinzaburo, "The Bakuhan System," in Tokugawa Japan: The Social and Eco
 nomic Antecedents of Modern Japan, ed. Nakane Chie and Oishi Shinzaburo (Tokyo: Uni
 versity of Tokyo Press, 1991), p. 22.
 102 Ikoku Nikki Shö, pp. 66-67.
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 cial permission to do business in Japan. Friendly relations and bilateral
 negotiations reached their pinnacle in the year 1609, owing to a sud
 den audience of the former governor of the Philippines, Rodrigo de
 Vivero y Velasco, before Tokugawa Ieyasu. The meeting was also the
 result of the stranding of a Manila galleon on the shores of Japan, but
 unlike in 1596 the Japanese held their word and did not confiscate
 goods nor harm anybody. After Ieyasu had initiated a meeting, the two
 state officials even worked out a bilateral contract that included ben
 eficial conditions for both the Japanese and the Spanish of Manila.103
 Despite initial good will on both sides, not a single article of their con
 tract was fulfilled.
 In terms of political economy and control of external affairs, the
 Japanese central government introduced a second elaborate measure
 to control foreign relations and reduce private gains next to the afore
 mentioned shuinjö system. The ito wappu, also known as yarn allotment
 or pancada, enabled the government to benefit from trade with the
 European intermediaries and to determine the type of interaction with
 them. Both affected trade with the European powers and, in the case
 of the Manila trade, theoretically put the bakufu into the position of
 rule maker. Thus, the Tokugawa shoguns could pride themselves with
 achieving sustained success in centralizing foreign trade, which leads us
 right to the last key element of this comparative study, the long-term
 effects of the Manila trade.
 The Long Durée Implications of the Manila Trade
 As indicated above, Manila did not just encourage maritime trade but
 also inspired premodern search for a proper identity. In this respect,
 Japan offers probably the best example. Both Toyotomi Hideyoshi and
 Tokugawa Ieyasu felt compelled to legitimize their power in and out
 side Japan and sought official recognition as sovereigns.104 For centu
 ries, China had dominated Japanese foreign affairs; however, ongoing
 tensions during the sixteenth century marked the beginning of a new
 era. Tributary trade was halted after the excesses of Japanese traders in
 103 Cabezas, Siglo Ibérico, p. 319. See also Dainihon shi XII, 6:658-667. The treaty
 included direct Japanese trade with Mexico, closer collaboration between the bakufu and
 the Spaniards in Manila, as well as access to a safe harbor in Japan in the case of distress at
 sea.
 104 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "The Frontiers of Japanese Identity," in Asian Forms of the
 Nation, ed. Hans Antlöv and Stein T0nnesson (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1996), pp.
 41-66.
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 1523 in Ningbo, where two rival Japanese tributary missions affronted
 Chinese authorities,105 and Hideyoshi's military aggression against
 both Korea and their Chinese allies meant the end of bilateral rela
 tions. Consequently, Japan's political unifiers had to find allies from
 outside the Sinocentric world to establish, legitimize, and maintain
 their central power on the archipelago. Thus Europeans became a wel
 come substitute for the "absence of China." Furthermore the Japanese
 began to enjoy advantages in maritime trade thanks to indirect access
 to Chinese markets via European intermediaries. In this respect, Japa
 nese dealings with the Iberians facilitated access to China and rendered
 tributary trade relations obsolete. In terms of legitimization, encoun
 ters with people from Europe and Southeast Asia helped the Japanese
 to escape the Sinocentric world-system. Once Japan considered herself
 no longer inferior to China, efforts were made to establish order in her
 international relations.106
 The dual nature of the local and global in sociopolitical structures
 of these three premodern states had further long-term implications for
 Manila. In China, private (i.e., unofficial) foreign trade increased as
 a consequence of the country's pressing need of silver during the six
 teenth century. The interesting question that follows is, why did offi
 cial China not support the Chinese merchants in Manila in channel
 ling bullion flows to China? Despite historical relations with smaller
 kingdoms in the region, such as tribute relationship with Butuan, a
 trading port on Mindanao,107 or interaction with the coastal region of
 Cagayan for its access to Igorot gold, Peking showed little interest in
 establishing official contact with the intruders from Europe in the era
 of the galleon trade. Nor did it respond to political change in the South
 China Sea in general. Government records pejoratively refer to the
 Castilians as red or Western yi or fan, a term used for non-Chinese, and
 occasionally they were accused of piracy. However, there is no evidence
 that Ming China objected to the new rulers of the Philippines. What
 is interesting is that despite acknowledging in the 1570s that Luzon
 was not a tributary country,108 goods sent by the Spanish were handled
 within the frame of traditional tally trade. In the year 1576, the assis
 105 Csaba Oláh, Räuberische Chinesen und Tückische Japaner: Die Diplomatischen Bezie
 hungen Zwischen China und Japan im 15. und 16. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz,
 2009). After profit-seeking Japanese merchants had been accused of disrespecting the Ming
 emperor, all trade with Japan was suspended.
 106 Morris Suzuki, Frontiers, pp. 41-48.
 107 Scott, Barangay, p. 164.
 108 Ming Shi-lu: http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/1013, accessed 8 March 2011.
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 tant censor-in-chief Liu Yao-hui, grand coordinator of Fujian, recorded
 that "the tribute memorial and local products brought by those of Luzon
 are submitted herewith."109 Spanish colonial authorities in the Philip
 pines considered such a treatment as an insult to the Spanish sover
 eignty. Before the Chinese authorities knew it, the governor-general
 put an end to the exchange of presents to make clear that Spain would
 not subordinate to tributary trade.110 This episode suggests a clash of
 Eastern and Western institutions that was complicated by the fact that
 neither system was flexible enough to react to it. In this context it is
 interesting to consider that the Dutch and other Europeans accepted a
 tributary barbarian status for the sake of access to the Chinese market.
 The Castilians were therefore an exception within European trading
 nations in Asia.111
 While the Castilian authorities were driven by territorial interests,
 the Ming dynasty preferred national security through guarding and
 defending the country's frontiers and ensuring domestic stability over
 economic improvements.112 Profits therefore remained as peripheral
 to the state as the maritime zone itself.113 Unlike Japan, the central
 state in China was not willing to make major compromises for the sake
 of economic gains. Policymakers considered private overseas trade a
 major risk to domestic stability, even after the relaxation of maritime
 trade in 1567 reduced it to a trickle. Since the state did not adapt
 its foreign policies to the more liberal maritime trade conditions, we
 tend to tone down Ming China's official objection against "liberal"
 foreign trade. However, as long as there were no major problems to be
 expected, Chinese maritime merchants were ironically the only trad
 ing group in Manila experiencing a kind of laissez-faire, since the state
 intervened in coastal politics only when it suspected problems. It can
 therefore be concluded that Ming China, against all expectations, was
 less "despotic" but remained a country that differed from Spain and
 Japan in terms of foreign trade and politics, an insight that calls for a
 serious study in the future.
 The Ming court's quasi-rejection of profit-oriented foreign trade
 109 Ming Shi-lu: http://epress.nus.edu.ss/msl/entry/1020, accessed 14 March 2011.
 110 Ollé, Empresa, p. 68.
 111 I think that we can learn a lot from the divergence in European commercial policies
 and aim to deepen our understanding in a survey in the future.
 112 A report of the Ministry of War of the year 1604 states that South China's coasts
 have to be cleaned up from evil people by referring to private traders from Luzon. See Ming
 Shi-lu: http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3135, accessed 23 March 2011.
 113 Wills, "Maritime China," pp. 204-207, 215.
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 was also displayed by the absence of initiatives that would have turned
 the pirates of the Southern Seas into merchants. In that regard, we
 may consider that active networks once frustrated take advantage from
 their skills in less-complicated systems. It seems therefore only logical
 that entrepreneurs from coastal China after having left their native
 country would start a business in Manila or even in New Spain.114 Mar
 itime Chinese traders did so—not only in Manila, but also in Melaka,
 Ayutthaya, Nagasaki, Batavia, and other Southeast Asian centers.115
 Ming China's foreign maritime trade policies doubtlessly show a huge
 conflict of interest between Peking and coastal China.116 Several writ
 ten sources from the late Ming period show that, on a local level, mari
 time officials were very much in favor of liberalizing foreign exchange
 for political and economic reasons, primarily for the sake of dampen
 ing the huge temptation of smuggling and fraud.117 During the period
 of increased private trade with the Spanish and the Dutch, numerous
 accusations of personal enrichment of tax supervisors and port officials
 reached Beijing, helping confirm to the court its previous suspicion of
 the evils of profit-oriented trade.118
 Conclusion
 We set out to understand how Spain, China, and Japan became entan
 gled in Manila and what that meant for the city itself and the premod
 ern states involved in her evolution into an early modern trading hub.
 For the purpose of analyzing the key elements of their Manila-related
 policies, I suggested focusing on the question of what had gone wrong.
 From a down-to-earth economic point of view it may be argued that in
 order to benefit economically from the Manila trade, merchants had to
 114 Braudel, Civilization, p. 164.
 115 An article in a recent issue of this journal gives a detailed overview of the flex
 ible networks that were operating in the South China Sea and its neighborhood. Craig A.
 Lockard, '"The Sea Common to All': Maritime Frontiers, Port Cities, and Chinese Traders
 in the Southeast Asian Age of Commerce, ca. 1400-1750," Journal of World History 21, no.
 2 (2010): 219-247.
 116 See also Lin Renchuan, "Fukien's Private Sea Trade in the Sixteenth and Seven
 teenth Centuries," in Development and Decline of Fukien Province in the i/th and 18th Centu
 ries, ed. E. B. Vermeer (Leiden: Brill, 1990), pp. 167-215.
 117 See Zhang Han's Songchuan mengyu of 1592 quoted by Nakajima Gakusho. For
 details refer to footnote no. 95.
 118 Ming Shi-lu: http://epress.nus.edu.sg/msl/entry/3169, accessed 11 March 2011.
This content downloaded from 130.60.63.99 on Fri, 09 Sep 2016 09:36:40 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 584  JOURNAL OF WORLD HISTORY, SEPTEMBER 20I2
 be competitive with others in the same trade. In early modern Manila,
 only private or semi-private enterprises seemed to fall into that cat
 egory. The states involved enacted few profit-oriented policies. Thus
 most business carried out in Manila was neither sustained nor sustain
 able. Although one may argue that the Manila galleon continued its
 silver journey until 1815, we must not forget that its peak years were
 between 1590 and 1620. What is most striking in the case of Manila
 was that this affected both the city itself and the states involved in
 this promising trade. One obvious reason was the dichotomy between
 private and central stakeholders. It is most likely that, unlike private
 merchants, all three central governments—despite their different
 geographical positions and political involvement—very often did not
 know what was going on. In that respect—with the exception of post
 1600 Japan—it is crucial to remember that these issues hardly ever
 reached the sovereign's desk but were dealt with by local government
 officials.
 Considering long-term effects, I have also tried to show that the
 triangular Manila trade cannot be explained entirely by merely look
 ing at early modern economies. As indicated at the beginning of this
 study, political factors were just as significant. Decision making, for
 instance, was affected by different ideas of sovereignty. Imperial Spain
 simply did not see the necessity of being competitive with the Chinese
 or the Japanese, who lacked hegemonic power over Manila. Despite
 sporadically feeling threatened by military attacks from East Asia, the
 Castilians never seriously considered them political challengers. In
 this respect the Spanish treated the East Asians differently from other
 Europeans in the South China Sea. Thanks to more flexible politi
 cal and economic institutions and cultural empathy, the Portuguese
 Jesuits and the merchants of the Dutch East India Company (VOC)
 succeeded in outrivaling their Spanish competitors whose operations
 were never free of missionary zeal.
 In terms of imposing policies that allowed the premodern state to
 control or even benefit from Manila, we may conclude that Japan was
 the one displaying the most efficiency. Nevertheless, the new system
 of diplomatic relations and the shuinjö trade in the eyes of the rulers
 did not sufficiently fulfill its purpose of internal and external control.
 This system was abolished four years before the central government
 refused access to their country after 1639 to all Westerners except the
 Dutch. By this time Tokugawa Japan had long lost its interest in deal
 ing with the Spaniards and in enhancing its position in Southeast Asia
 and the transpacific trade, for important hegemonic goals had been
 met already. Withdrawing from the sea meant not subordinating to any
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 other states' rules—neither to China's tributary system nor to highly
 competitive European mercantilism that had reached its peak in Asia
 after the arrival of the British and the Dutch at the beginning of the
 seventeenth century. Just as in imperial China, Japan had established
 its own rules—only outsiders who completely acquiesced to the Japa
 nese terms and conditions, such as VOC merchants, were tolerated as
 negotiating parties.
 What does that tell us about economy and state in the early mod
 ern period? In all three premodern states, governance and sovereignty
 held center stage and influenced developments in both the domestic
 and export markets that in turn had an impact on proto-globalization
 processes. New evidence suggests that the factors that led to different
 economic developments in foreign trade in Asia and Europe were not
 just contingent but also the product of different political motivations.
 While it has often been claimed that China was the overall "winner" as
 most of the silver ended up there, a minor change in perspective chal
 lenges the black-and-white view of the Spanish performance. Nobody
 will deny that tremendous amounts of silver drained off to China, but
 at the same time Spain benefitted both economically and politically.
 It earned from arbitrage in the silk trade—albeit limited—and main
 tained its power for several centuries regardless of major transformation
 processes in the East.
 Returning to the question of Manila's failure in maintaining its
 global significance, in the case of Spain we may conclude that it was not
 other nations' success but the dynamics of a bulky overseas empire that
 caused permanent problems. Involvement in European, American, and
 East Asian affairs, such as protests in Spain, hegemonic competition
 with the Portuguese and the Dutch, and frictions with the Japanese,
 showed that the Philippines were difficult to integrate into the existing
 territory-based colonial programs that only worked with large numbers
 of dedicated settlers from other Spanish territories. Political maneuver
 ing was furthermore complicated by the dualism of the Church and
 colonial authorities, the high degree of bureaucracy—aggravated by
 huge distances—and the over-restriction of the transpacific trade that
 encouraged smuggling and corruption.
 In East Asia, Japan managed to turn economic drives into political
 benefits for the central government in Edo. During the early decades
 of the transpacific trade, both Chinese and Japanese merchants had
 incentives to meet and trade in Manila. The sudden withdrawal of
 Japan and her rigorous foreign policies after 1639 have blurred histori
 ans' view on her relevance for the early modern world. When reassess
 ing Manila's role in global history, however, we must not overlook that
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 as a consequence of a successful state formation and economic restruc
 turing, Japan's aspired hegemonic position in East Asia was redefined.
 Through interactions with Spain and China in the decades prior to her
 "closure," Japan managed to become an independent economic player
 and what one may label the first real premodern state in East Asia, all
 thanks to efficient institutions.
This content downloaded from 130.60.63.99 on Fri, 09 Sep 2016 09:36:40 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
